Memorandum on U.S.-Russia Nuclear
Relations
From: Chandler
Skolnick
CC: Professor
Shirk
To: Secretary of
State Tillerson
22 March 2017
Recent U.S.-Russia Nuclear Plans
In the decades following World War II,
the United States and USSR/Russia have attempted to decrease the threat of
nuclear warfare between each other through constant negotiations of
establishing non-proliferation agreements. Despite such talks, the two opposing
superpowers have been unable to find an agreement that will successfully remain
in tact as well as equally deal with the threat of nuclear weapons by Russia,
which is specifically displayed since the fall of the Soviet Union with the
negotiations of the START agreements.
START Programs
First announced in 1982, the first
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) enacted limitations and reductions on
both nations’ strategic nuclear weapons. This agreement limited the amount of
delivery vehicles (ICBMs and MIRVs) to 1,600, while also limiting nuclear
weapons to 6,000 on an incremental scale (Andreason). This plan was delayed due
to several minor non-negotiable terms by the USSR and was officially signed in
1988.
In
1993, START II was signed, which was another bilateral treaty between the U.S.
and Russia on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms
(Andreason). The aim was to limit MIRVs and ICBMs on both sides in a two-phase
scale back. The ultimate goal was to reduce nuclear warheads to 3,000 with no
more than 650 on ICBMs (Viakov). The treaty was never truly put into effect as
it was stalled by Russia in protest of U.S. involvement in Kosovo, and then
only ceremoniously ratified due to American strong-arming.
START
III was a failed agreement in 1997. It aimed to gradually reduce the amount of
nuclear warheads on either side to no more than 2,500 by 2007. The discussion
of commencing the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and other tactical
weapons was also a major agreement made in this deal (Viakov). Despite this, it
was never signed and was quickly overshadowed by the SORT negotiations.
SORT
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT) was an agreement that was enacted between 2003 and 2011, limiting both
nations’ deployment of strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 2,200
(Andreason). This Treaty failed to discuss the destruction of nuclear warheads,
or even the limits to tactical weapons, nor were the implementations technically
permanent; as well as the fact that it held no punishments for failing to
adhere to the aforementioned terms. New START swiftly replaced SORT after
several years.
New START
Since the START II Treaty was technically
still enacted, President Obama chose to build negotiations based on that rather
than continue the SORT Agreement (Cox 255). In what is called the New START,
both nations are limited to no more than ICBM launchers as well as other
delivery systems (Diakov). It also limits the amount of nuclear warheads to no
more than 1,550. This Treaty was put into effect in 2011, and will be up for
renewal in 2021.
Problems Regarding These Agreements
Time and time again, Russia has proven to
be stubborn in their promises to reduce and/or limit their nuclear arsenal.
Just recently, President Trump has issued statements claiming that Russia has
been expanding their nuclear weapons cache (Lockie). Clearly, they are not
adhering to the various agreements that both U.S. and Russian leaders have
agreed to over the past few decades. In recent 2016 statistics, Russia
currently has more warheads than when the New START agreement was signed in
2011 (Kristensen). The U.S. must take a new tactic towards dealing with
Russia’s nuclear lust.
Solution
In order to appropriately deal with the
Russian Government, a firm stance must be taken. It must first be acknowledged
that a world with no nuclear weapons is a realistically dangerous world. This
is due to the fact that if no country in the world contains nuclear weapons,
then the first country or organization to gain control of such a weapon is at
the greatest chance of using it, since there is no possibility of facing
retaliation from another nuclear weapon. With that being said, Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD) is the world’s best defense at preventing a nuclear strike.
It is clear that it is futile for the U.S. Government to place trust in Russia
to abide by the restrictions and guidelines that are set in place; nor is it
possible to establish an agreement that places more supervision on Russia’s
disarmament. History has proven that Russia can be stubborn, specifically by
blocking such an agreement from being ratified, if more supervision or
restrictions are added to such a treaty.
Therefore,
the best course of action would be to disregard the New START, as Russia is
clearly not taking it seriously. Instead, the United States Government needs to
revamp its production and advancement of nuclear technology. It must be
highlighted that this is not done in an aggressive manor toward Russia, but
more of a healthy competition to increase the U.S. arsenal compared to Russia.
The United States has proven in the past that it can unequivocally outspend
Russia and build superior weapons, which causes the inevitability that Russia
will be unable to keep up, and thus be forced to concede to a scale back of
weapons, one that will be much more in line with what the U.S. originally wanted.
Without a display of economic and technological advancement by the United
States, he Russian Government will never willingly level the playing fields.
They must first be broken; only then will they willingly sit at the table to
negotiate fairly.
Works Cited
Andreason, Steve. "A Strong
Start." Foreign Affairs. N.p.,
04 Jan. 2016. Web. 23 Mar. 2017.
Cox, Michael, and Doug Stokes. US Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford UP,
2012. Print.
Diakov, Anatoli. "TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." Instant
Research on Peace and Violence 5.1, The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (1975): 55-58. Web.
Kristensen, Hans M. "New START Data
Shows Russian Warhead Increase Before Expected Decrease." Federation Of American Scientists. N.p.,
n.d. Web. 23 Mar. 2017.
Lockie, Alex. "How the US's Nuclear
Weapons Compare to Russia's." Business
Insider. Business Insider, 28 Sept. 2016. Web. 23 Mar. 2017.
Chandler, I like how you layout the deals and history of the START and SORT treaties, and pose a well-informed solution to the future of the US-Russia nuclear arsenals. I agree that a world without nuclear weaposn is dangerous, as the formulas to make them exist, therefore ensuring almost anyone can construct a weapon, even if we destroy the ones that are already made. My issue with this solution is the overproduction of nuclear weapons. I agree they are helpful in ensuring our defense from other nuclear states, but by creating more weapons than necessary would give other non-nuclear states concerns, and might begin to effect our relations with them. How would you plan on finding the "right" number of nuclear weapons to keep armed?
ReplyDeleteHi Chandler! Awesome post! The question I would pose to you is why is it necessary to have several thousand nuclear weapons? They cost a ton of money and have only been used twice in history. With the destruction that we caused in Japan by using just two atomic bombs, why would the US need to create and maintain thousands of these, since we would realistically never need that amount.
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